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Abstract. In many countries, the representation of women on corporate
boards of directors has become a topic of intense political debate. Social
networking plays a crucial role in the appointment to a board so that
an informed debate requires knowing where women are located in the
network of directors. One way to quantify the network is by studying the
links created by serving on the same board and by joint appointments on
multiple boards. We analyse a network of ≈ 320 000 board members of
36 000 companies traded on stock exchanges all over the world, focusing
specifically on the position of women in the network. Women only have
≈ 9− 13% of all seats, but they are not marginalised. Applying metrics
from social network analysis, we find that their influence is close to that
of men. We do not find evidence to support previous claims that women
play the role of “queen bees” that exclude other women from similar
positions.
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1 Introduction
Females on boards of directors and board diversity more broadly are the topic
of many studies [1,8,16]. Research has shown that female board representation is
“positively related to accounting returns” [31]. The World Bank [36] estimates
that 39% of the worldwide labour force in 2016 are women, but the percentage
of women in leadership positions is much lower. Recent reports state that only
24% of senior management positions [17] and 15% of corporate board seats [6]
are held by women. The percentage of female CEOs among Fortune 500 firms is
even lower (6.4%) [27]. Women’s chances to become a CEO or a board member
depend on multiple factors, such as “country wealth, gender egalitarianism and
humane orientation” [13]. Nevertheless, female board participation is slowly on
the rise globally. Shareholders and governments no longer regard it as a legitimate
practice to recruit directors from an exclusively male “old-boys network” [30,11].
Various countries, for example Israel [23] and Norway [32], have enacted laws
that favour the appointment of women [33]. As a consequence, there are signs
that, at least in some European countries, the “glass ceiling” that has kept
women out of the boardrooms is beginning to crack [14].
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2 Evtushenko and Gastner
Once appointed, female directors must navigate intricate networks of profes-
sional relationships. A concrete manifestation of such a professional network are
“interlocking directorates” [25] (i.e. the practice that some directors hold seats
on more than one board). A recent survey by Credit Suisse [7] relates “over-
boarding” (i.e. an excessive number of board seats held by an individual) to
the current trend towards increasing the number of female board members. The
probability that a woman joins the board has been shown to be negatively cor-
related with the number of women currently on the board and to increase when
a woman departs the board [15]. The underlying assumption is that companies
tend to recruit “token women” (i.e. exactly one per board) from a limited pool of
female candidates [10,35]. Some commentators compare women directors with
multiple seats to queen bees [37], implying that these women allegedly usurp
power at the expense of female competitors. The purpose of this article is to test
whether such narratives stand up to quantitative scrutiny.
Board interlocks can be inferred from a bipartite graph where every edge
is between one company and one director (Figure 1) [2]. Each director at one
end of an edge sits on the board of the company at the other end of this edge.
The study of board interlock networks started already in the 1970s [34], but at
that time the role of the director’s gender was not yet in the limelight. Interest
in the role of women on boards has intensified in recent years, see for example
Ref. [12] for a critical review. Still, relatively little is known about the role that
the gender plays for the network formed by interlocking directorates.
Fig. 1. Network representations of board interlock. (a) Bipartite graph where every
edge is between a company (large node) and a person (i.e. a director, small node). (b)
In this article, we analyse the social network of directors that results from a one-mode
projection of the bipartite graph: directors are connected if and only if they sit together
on a board.
A woman’s position in the social network certainly influences her chances
to be appointed to a board [3], but only few papers have analysed the real
network [39,20,32,26]. The most comprehensive quantitative network study to
date is the PhD thesis by Hawarden [18], which looks at empirical data and builds
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a modelling framework called “Glass Network” theory. It posits the existence of
“glass nets” that prevent women from assuming board seats, but those women
who succeeded in crossing a glass net behave like queen bees. We further the
exploration of this topic using network analysis applied to a large dataset, which
we now describe.
2 Data
The source of our data is the Financial Times [38], an international English-
language newspaper specialising in business and economics. Its website is a
source of up-to-date information on financial markets and companies traded
as equities. The website has data on the performance and structure of roughly
36 000 companies from 54 countries. The resulting data base is, to the best of
our knowledge, the largest that has so far been used in the literature on board
interlocks. The Financial Times (FT) receives their information from the media
company Thomson Reuters, which in principle has data on yet more firms. How-
ever, we decided to use the FT data because this subset is more representative
of companies that make up the business world.
The specific fields that we obtained for each company were name, unique
code, sector, industry (i.e. subsector), country, revenue for the past 12 months,
number of employees, date incorporated, and a list of directors, each if avail-
able. For each director, we recorded his or her name, gender, and age, each if
included in the FT database. People were then identified as the same individ-
ual and assigned a unique ID if their three fields matched (for example, the
names and genders were the same, and ages were blank) because we assume
that the underlying Thomson Reuters database would have identical entries on
each individual in all his or her companies. There were a total of 35 927 compa-
nies and 321 967 directors. Here we make no distinction between executive and
non-executive directors.
In terms of missing data, 273 companies have zero directors listed. Among
the fields relevant to the analysis, for 5732 companies (15.95%) we have no in-
formation about the country, for 4461 (12.41%) no sector, and for 5020 (13.97%)
no industry. 96 751 directors (30.1%) are listed without gender. For 126 092 di-
rectors (39.2%), the database contains no information about their age. We show
summary statistics of the network and the subgraphs consisting of only male or
only female nodes in Table 1.
3 Summary Statistics of Node Attributes
The proportion of female directors in the FT data is 9.43% of all nodes and
13.49% among people with confirmed gender. This percentage is comparable to
values stated in previous studies of international data. For example, Dawson et
al. [6] found that women hold 14.7% of seats in the CS Gender 3000 data base;
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Table 1. Statistics of the full network and the subgraphs consisting of only male or only
female nodes. We calculate the average path length with the harmonic mean formula
by Newman [28] to handle disconnected components.
nodes all male female
edges 2809623 1092004 44666
diameter 24 29 40
average path length 13.90 22.90 517.79
density 5.4× 10−5 5.7× 10−5 9.6× 10−5
components 9404 12393 12355
% of nodes in the largest component 74.7 74.8 79.4
% of edges in the largest component 85.5 85.1 89.6
Deloitte [9] puts this number at 15% for data from nearly 7000 companies. Both
of these reports emphasise that there can conceivably be a difference between
the proportion of female directors and the proportion of female seats because
of overboarding. On the boards of S&P500 companies, overboarding is more
prevalent among women [7]. However, in the more comprehensive FT data, we
find that, at the international level, the proportions of seats and directors are
similar: the percentage of female seats is 9.73% and thus only 0.29% larger than
the percentage of female directors. The underlying reason is that overboarding
hardly differs between genders: 14.7% of women and 14.8% of men are multiple
directors. Overall, taking into account ungendered nodes, 14.06% of directors
are multiple directors. 4.22% of directors are on more than 2 boards, 1.76% on
more than 3, and 0.40% on more than 5.
It is interesting to see whether the ratio of female seats to all seats differs by
country, sector or industry. We can easily compute these numbers because for
each company we know its country, sector, and industry, as well as the number
of all directors and the number of female directors.
Figure 2 plots the proportion by sector and then subdivides each sector by in-
dustry, with industries following their sectors in descending order. We note that
women are more represented in Financials, Consumer Services and Telecommu-
nications than in Technology and Basic Materials. These findings are consistent
with the report by Credit Suisse [6].
We find greater discrepancy between our data and Credit Suisse when we split
our data by country (Figure 3) instead of sector or industry. While we agree that
Scandinavian countries generally rank highly, we find lower percentages of female
seats than those reported by both Credit Suisse and Deloitte [9]. For example,
we find the percentage of female seats in Sweden to be 21.52%, whereas Credit
Suisse reports 33.6% and Deloitte 31.7%. We believe that the difference is due
to our larger sample size. The FT data base includes 465 Swedish companies
compared to only 125 in Deloitte’s data.
The top-ranked country in our data is Ukraine (22.6%). We have not found
previous reports on female directors in Ukraine so that we cannot rule out that
its top rank is owed to a relatively small sample size of only 19 Ukrainian compa-
nies. Another surprisingly highly ranked country is Thailand (19.5%). Although
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Deloitte estimates the percentage to be only 11.7%, it is plausible that the true
number is higher because Thailand is among the countries with the largest pro-
portion (37%) of women in senior management [17]. Near the bottom of the
ranking is Japan (1.2%) where our number is even lower than previous esti-
mates (Credit Suisse: 3.5%, Deloitte: 4.1%).
Similar to the worldwide trend mentioned above, the proportion of female
directors by country hardly differs from the proportion of female seats (i.e. the
data shown in Figure 3). We have inferred the country of a person as the most
common country of her or his companies. Based on this assumption, we have
calculated the countrywide proportion of female directors. In every country in-
cluded in the FT database, it differs by less than 0.022% from the proportion
of female seats so that the conclusions do not depend on whether we use female
seats or female directors as the basis of our analysis.
Another measure for comparing female representation across countries is the
proportion of companies with at least one woman on their boards. Worldwide,
we find that 50.3% of companies have at least one director who FT identifies
as female. Because FT does not include gender information for 30.1% of the
directors (see section 2), the true percentage of companies with women on their
boards is likely to be higher. Lee et al. [24] estimate 73.5% for the smaller
MSCI data base. The country rankings, shown in Figure 4 (grey bars in the
plot), are similar to those for the proportion of female directors by country in
Figure 3. Ukraine drops to the ninth position, but the Scandinavian countries
and Thailand maintain their high rankings. Oman, Japan, Pakistan, and Qatar
remain at the bottom.
It is instructive to compare the observed percentage of companies with women
on their boards with the expected values from a simple probabilistic null model.
We assume that the probability of a seat being held by a woman is equal to
the observed fraction p of female seats in a given country. In the null model, we
assume that the assignment of women to seats is independent of the gender of
the other seats. Suppose the size of a board is s. For each of the s seats, we flip a
biased coin which shows heads with probability p and tails with probability 1−p.
When the coin shows heads, the seat is, in this model, given to a woman. The
probability that the company’s board has at least one woman equals 1−(1−p)s.
If the fraction of boards with s seats is fs, then the expected fraction of boards
with women is
∑
s fs[1− (1− p)s].
The alternative hypothesis is that companies tend to have a single token
woman on their boards. In this hypothesis, a woman is only added when there
is currently no other woman on the board [15,35]. With exactly one woman, the
board satisfies a minimum criterion of diversity that reduces external pressure
for greater female representation without seriously threatening the power of the
“old-boys network”. If the token woman hypothesis is true, there would be a
higher proportion of boards with exactly one female board member than in the
null model.
We calculated the null model’s expectation value for the global data and
the predicted proportion of single-woman boards for each country. Worldwide,
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Fig. 2. Proportion of female seats by sector (darker colour) and industry (i.e. subsector,
lighter colour).
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Fig. 3. Proportion of female seats by country.
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Fig. 4. Observed and predicted proportions of companies with at least one woman
on their boards by country. The observed proportion is shown in grey. The predicted
proportion is the combination of the grey and the blue bar. The prediction is calculated
under the assumption that seats are taken by both genders independently given the
observed proportion of female seats in each country (see text). The prediction is higher
than the observed proportion in all cases except Slovenia, where the prediction is only
slightly lower.
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we find that the prediction is higher than the observation (0.604 vs. 0.507). On
the level of individual countries, Slovenia is the only case where the prediction
is lower than the observation, but even there the predicted proportion is only
lower by 0.0013. In all other countries, there are fewer single-woman boards than
predicted by the null model (Figure 4). In some cases (e.g. Iceland or the United
States) the difference is substantial. This implies that women are generally more
clustered than expected if they were distributed randomly, contradicting the
token woman hypothesis.
Although we find no evidence that women are recruited as tokens, their num-
ber has increased in recent years. As a consequence, women directors are, on
average, younger than their male colleagues. In Figure 5, we plot the age distri-
bution by gender for all directors for whom the FT database contains information
about both age and gender. The figure makes it clear that the distributions are
centered at a different age: the mean is 50.8 years for women and 55.1 for men.
The solid curves in Figure 5 show that the age distribution is approximately
normal for both genders. Strictly speaking, neither the female nor the male
distribution passes a χ2-test for normality (p-values < 10−9) because they are
slightly skewed towards higher age. However, the deviations from normality are
sufficiently small to justify using Welch’s two-sample t-test. The null hypothesis
of an equal mean for men and women is strongly rejected (p-value < 10−15). Our
result is consistent with earlier studies of French [24] and Singaporean data [40]
where female directors were found to be on average 5–10 years younger.
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Fig. 5. The age distribution of directors by gender. Both distributions are well approx-
imated by Gaussian functions (black solid curves), but with different means (dashed
lines): the mean age of male directors is 55.1 years, that of female directors 50.8 years.
The FT data contain information about the age of more than 200 000 directors. Note
that 164 directors had their age listed as 1 year. We have removed these data points
from our analysis.
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4 The position of women in the network
While the attributes discussed in the previous section already give us some in-
sight into gender differences, we can only truly assess the role of women when
considering their positions in the network. As we explained in the introduction,
our data can be viewed as a bipartite network where edges run between direc-
tors and boards (Figure 1a). In this network, there are 2 809 623 edges connecting
321 967 directors to 35 927 boards. The average board size (of those available) is
11.02. The mean size of a board without women is 8.88, whereas boards with at
least one woman have on average 13.10 seats. Some care needs to be taken when
interpreting these numbers. Even in our earlier null model, where we assumed
that seats are independently taken by men and women, the mean size of a board
with a woman is larger than the mean size without a woman. The reason is
that, in this model, the probability of at least one woman on a board of size s is
1− (1− p)s and thus increases with s. The mean board size conditioned on the
presence of at least one woman is
µnull ≡ E[board size | woman] =
∑∞
s=1 sfs[1− (1− p)s]∑∞
s=1 fs[1− (1− p)s]
,
where fs is, as before, the fraction of boards with s seats. We find µnull = 12.97,
comparable to the observed value 13.10, but statistically significantly smaller
(p-value < 10−8). This result confirms previous observations that larger boards
tend to have a higher probability of recruiting women [4,5,29].
Larger boards tend to be in the largest component of the bipartite network.
In the one-mode projection that only contains the directors as nodes (Figure 1b),
the largest component consists of 74.7% of the nodes and 85.5% of the edges.
Given that women are more likely to be on larger boards, it is not surprising
that the proportion of women in the largest component (79.4%) exceeds the
fraction of nodes belonging to that component. We confirm with the χ2-test
proposed by Hawarden & Marsland [19] that the proportion of women in the
largest component is significantly higher than that of men (p-value < 10−15). We
therefore agree with their previous result that, although women are a minority,
they are not marginalised by being confined to unconnected, and hence less
influential, components.
In terms of degree and betweenness centrality statistics, women are doing
marginally better than men (Table 2). The distributions of degree and between-
ness centrality by gender are not normal but instead seem to follow power laws.
We normalise them by log-transforming the data and restricting our sample to
the largest component and nodes with the parameter of interest > 0. The two-
sample t-test for degree concludes that the marginal difference between men and
women is statistically significant (p-value < 0.0001). The difference in the be-
tweenness centrality is not statistically significant at a significance level of 0.05
(p-value 0.068).
Women on boards 11
Table 2. Summary statistics of the network with all nodes (i.e. nodes identified as
male, female, and those with missing gender information) and all edges. Larger values
are highlighted in bold. “Like degree” is the degree between nodes of the same gender.
We calculate the closeness centrality with the harmonic mean formula by Newman [28]
to handle disconnected components.
nodes all male female
% of all 100 60.5 9.43
% in the largest component 74.7 74.8 79.4
maximum degree 1040 1016 1030
average degree 17.45 16.68 18.74
average “like degree” 11.21 2.94
average degree
19.97 19.05 20.98
in largest component
maximum betweenness centrality 9.864× 108 9.864× 108 4.755× 108
average betweenness centrality 6.515× 105 6.556× 105 8.519× 105
average betweenness centrality
8.709× 105 8.753× 105 10.72× 105
in largest component
maximum closeness centrality 0.143 0.143 0.143
average closeness centrality 0.071 0.072 0.078
average closeness centrality
0.096 0.099 0.097
in largest component
maximum clustering coefficient 1 1 1
average clustering coefficient 0.939 0.935 0.936
average clustering coefficient
0.9289 0.9243 0.9272
in largest component
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed a new dataset which allows us to better un-
derstand interlocking directorates. In particular, it has allowed us to show the
differences of female representation by country and industry. Overall, there are
still many fewer women than men on boards, but our analysis contradicts the to-
ken woman hypothesis whereby companies recruit exactly one woman to escape
accusations of discrimination. A limitation of our dataset is that it only indicates
presence or absence of a link, but not its strength, which has been hypothesised
to depend on gender [21,22]. Our binary data, however, do not show evidence
that women are marginalised.
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